In 1850, Zachary Taylor -- the last president born
before the Constitution -- could look back on vast changes during
his adult life. The population of the United States had doubled
and then doubled again. Pushing relentlessly westward and
southward, Americans had similarly quadrupled the size of their
country by settling, conquering, annexing, or purchasing territory
that had been occupied for millennia by Indians and claimed by
France, Spain, Britain, and Mexico. During the same half-century
the gross national product increased sevenfold. No other nation
in that era could match even a single component of this explosive
growth. The combination of all three made America the Wunderkind
nation of the nineteenth century.
Regarded as "progress" by most Americans,
this unparalleled and unrestrained growth had negative as well as
positive consequences. For Indians it was a story of contraction
rather than expansion, of decline from a vital culture toward
dependence and apathy. The one-seventh of the population that was
black also bore much of the burden of progress while reaping few
of its benefits. Slave-grown crops sustained part of the era's
economic growth and much of its territorial expansion. The
cascade of cotton from the American South dominated the world
market, paced the industrial revolution in England and New
England, and fastened the shackles of slavery more securely than
ever on Afro-Americans.
Even for white Americans, economic growth did not
necessarily mean unalloyed progress. Although per capita income
doubled during the half-century, not all sectors of society shared
equally in this abundance. While both rich and poor enjoyed
rising incomes, their inequality of wealth widened significantly.
More dangerous was the specter of ethnic conflict. After 1830
waves of immigrants, most of them Roman Catholic, alarmed some
Protestant Americans, sparking nativist organizations that
resisted cultural pluralism.
The greatest danger to American survival at
midcentury, however, was neither class tension nor ethnic
division. Rather it was sectional conflict between North and
South over the future of slavery. To many Americans, human
bondage seemed incompatible with the founding ideals of the
republic. If all men were created equal and endowed by the
creator with certain inalienable rights including liberty and the
pursuit of happiness, what could justify the enslavement of
several millions of these men (and women)? The generation that
fought the Revolution abolished slavery in states north of the
Mason-Dixon line; the new states north of the Ohio River came into
the Union without bondage. South of those boundaries, however,
slavery became essential to the region's economy and culture.
Meanwhile, a wave of Protestant revivals known as the
Second Great Awakening swept the country during the first third of
the nineteenth century. In New England, upstate New York, and
those portions of the Old North west above the 41st parallel
populated by the descendants of New England Yankees, this
evangelical enthusiasm generated a host of moral and cultural
reforms. The most dynamic and divisive of them was
abolitionism.
By midcentury this antislavery movement had gone into
politics and had begun to polarize the country. Slaveholders did
not consider themselves egregious sinners. And they managed to
convince most nonslaveholding whites in the South (two-thirds of
the white population there) that emancipation would produce
economic ruin, social chaos, and racial war. The slavery issue
would probably have caused an eventual showdown between North and
South in any circumstances. But it was the country's sprawling
growth that made the issue so explosive. Was the manifest destiny
of those two million square miles west of the Mississippi River to
be free or slave? Like King Solomon, Congress had tried in 1820
to solve that problem for the Louisiana Purchase by splitting it
at the latitude of 36" 30' (with slavery allowed in Missouri
as an exception north of that line). But this only postponed the
crisis. In 1850 Congress postponed it again with another
compromise. By 1860 it could no longer be deferred. The
country's territorial growth might have created a danger of
dismemberment by centrifugal force in any event. But slavery
brought this danger to a head at midcentury.
At the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 the
United States was an insignificant nation on the European
periphery. Its population was about the same as Ireland's.
Thomas Jefferson thought that the Empire for Liberty he had bought
from Napoleon was sufficient to absorb a hundred generations of
America's population growth. By 1850, two generations later,
Americans were not only filling up this empire but were spilling
over into a new one on the Pacific coast. A few years after 1850
the United States surpassed Britain to become the most populous
nation in the Western world save Russia and France. By 1860 the
country contained nearly thirty-two million people, four million
of them slaves. During the previous half-century the American
population had grown four times faster than Europe's and six times
the world average.
Three factors explained this phenomenon: a birth
rate half again as high as Europe's; a death rate slightly lower;
and immigration. All three were linked to the relative abundance
of the American economy. The ratio of land to people was much
greater than in Europe, making food supply more plentiful and
enabling couples to marry earlier and to have more children.
Though epidemics frequently ravaged North America, they took a
lesser toll in its largely rural environment than among Europe's
denser population. The land/people ratio in the United States
raised wages and offered opportunities that attracted five million
immigrants during that half-century.
Although the United States remained predominantly
rural in this period, the urban population (defined as those
living in towns or cities with 2,500 or more people) grew three
times faster than the rural population from 1810 to 1860, going
from 6 percent to 20 percent of the total. This was the highest
rate of urbanization in American history. During those same
decades the percentage of the labor force engaged in
nonagricultural pursuits grew from 21 to 45 percent. Meanwhile
the rate of natural increase of the American population, while
remaining higher than Europe's, began to slow as parents, desiring
to provide their children with more nurture and education, decided
to have fewer of them. From 1800 to 1850 the American birth rate
declined by 23 percent. The death rate also decreased
slightly-but probably no more than 5 percent. Yet the population
continued to grow at the same pace through the whole period --
about 35 percent each decade -- because rising immigration offset
the decline of the birth rate. For the half-century as a whole,
the margin of births over deaths caused three-quarters of the
population increase while immigration accounted for the rest.
Economic growth fueled these demographic changes.
The population doubled every twenty-three years; the gross
national product doubled every fifteen. At some point after the
War of 1812 -- probably following recovery from the depression of
1819-23 -- the economy began to grow faster than the population.
Although most Americans benefited from this rise of income, those
at the top benefited more than those at the bottom. While average
income rose 102 percent, real wages for workers increased by
somewhere between 40 and 65 percent. This widening disparity
between rich and poor appears to have characterized most
capitalist economies during their early decades of intensive
growth and industrialization.
Copyright © 2003 James M. McPherson
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